Paul Krugman and Gavyn Davies on secular stagnation

Paul Krugman steps in to clarify the distinction between stagnation in growth rates brought upon by a reduced growth in supply – population, technology, participation – and demand.   His piece was prompted by Gavyn Davies’ reporting on some econometrics that hope to establish whether or not we are experiencing secular stagnation.

First, on Krugman.  I don’t think he quite gets the policy implications of the two right.  In particular, he says that the only thing to do if we have supply-side stagnation is to live within our reduced means [if indeed they are reduced;  lower population growth doesn't mean slower growth in GDP per head].  By contrast, if the stagnation is induced by persistently weak demand, then we need higher expected (thus actual) inflation, or looser fiscal policy, or both.

However, if stagnation is supply-side induced, then more inflation is warranted.  Let’s suppose that the nominal interest rate consistent with the economy running at full capacity will equal roughly the real growth rate plus the inflation rate.  Higher inflation will be needed, or other wise there will be less room to cut nominal interest rates to fight contractions in demand that will come, superimposed on the slower supply side growth.  Less room to cut rates will mean more and longer episodes at the zero lower bound and more recourse to unconventional monetary instruments of uncertain effect and cost.  And this preventative higher target inflation is needed for the same reason that it would be needed to guard against a future bout of demand-side secular stagnation – allowing deeper and more prolonged monetary stimulus.  So, in fact, the monetary policy implications of the two growth pathologies overlap somewhat.

Second, on Gavyn Davies.  He reports results from a dynamic factor model that show how the underlying, ‘long run’ growth rates of Western economies have been slipping for a long time, and that the poor performance is not just a feature of the crisis.  [Long run in quotes here, because now the long run is something that moves around in the short run].   The factor estimated in the econometrics picks up the thing that the many manifestations of output – not only national accounts data, but survey data, whatever gets thrown into the pot – have in common.  That thing in common seems to be growing at an ever slower rate.  Whether the econometrics helps identify the cause depends on what kind of macro theory you buy into.

If you are a sticky price New Keynesian, and you have digested the analysis of the zero bound and how economies can get trapped there (and taken recent history to vindicate you), and/or you have bought the conjectures of Summers and others about persistently weak demand, and the emerging theoretical support from Eggertson’s recent working paper, then you will not find econometrics like this helpful in identifying causes.  Why?  Because you will be someone who thinks that there can be both persistent demand and supply side influences on output.

If you are a flex price macro person you will think the zero bound pretty much irrelevant to the real side of the economy.   And persistent – in fact any – departures of demand from supply won’t make sense to you.  So the secular stagnation hypothesis, and the necessity of a large and protracted fiscal stimulus to counter it, will not make sense either.  Your reading of a factor model for output will simply be one that distinguishes between high and low-frequency, equilibrium influences.

This factor model’s chart of long-run output growth will only be indicative of its causes if you are a sticky price macro person who hasn’t yet bought the demand-side secular stagnation hypothesis.  In that case you’ll take the view that low-frequency changes in the growth rate of output will be caused by the supply-side.  Since at low frequencies (over long periods) prices can change, equalising demand and supply.

 

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Why I’m against helicopter drops

More on helicopter money, prompted by Simon Wren Lewis’ post, and exchanges with Eric Lonnergan and others in the comments appended to my last post on this.

First, responding to Simon.  He says that I argue “that if the central bank assumes money is irredeemable, and starts printing a lot of it, people may stop wanting to use it. If they do that, it will no longer be seen as wealth.” Simon remarks: “This is real angels and pins stuff that can come from taking microfoundations too seriously.”

Most people won’t click through to my post, and if you read that paragraph, you would not get why I wrote the post, or what I think about helicopter drops and why.  The message is:  ‘Tony, taking a too-literal reading of the wrong microfounded model, decides helicopter drops won’t work, so don’t take him seriously.’

I’m against helicopter drops.  That bit is faithfully got over.  And I worry about them using three lines of reasoning.

1) OLG and ‘new monetarist’ models of money, in which money is not redeemable.  But in which we can show that some monetary policies generate money that has value, and some [like excessive money creation] destroy it.

2) casual historical empiricism that money’s value has been destroyed by excessive money financing.

3) I look at Buiter’s proposal to take the standard non-microfounded model of money [which assumes money has liquidity services, and that at the end of infinite time is redeemed] and to remove the redeemability assumption.  And decide that it doesn’t get us closer to deciding what theory says would happen if there were helicopter drops.  Why not?  Because this begs the question about why we should assume money has those liquidity services.

Whether 1) and 3) should be part of the calculation to helicopter money in or not depends on whether you want to use theory to answer the question.

Simon goes on to say:  “Just ask yourself what you would do if you received a cheque in the post from the central bank.”

This urges us not to worry about trying to find a theory to guide us about whether money will be felt as wealth or not.  It just is, isn’t it, by introspection.  Well, no.  Sure, I can get the answer from myself that I will go ‘wtf is going on with policy now, are we really this far up sh!ts creek?  Whatever, I had better try to spend it’.  But figuring out what happens next, in general equilibrium, whether people would feel more wealthy or not, and whether this amounts to a worthwhile policy or not, is much harder.  Which is partly why theory and empirics might be useful.

Simon then says:  “As Nick Rowe points out in this post, we can cut through all this by noting the link between money creation and inflation targets. The money required to sustain an inflation target will not be redeemed, so it can be regarded as wealth.”

If this is intended as a point of theory, (I’m not sure whether it is or not) then it’s not right.  And if it isn’t intended as theory, then redeemability is irrelevant.  To explain.

Intended as theory:  if we think theory is useful, we have two choices of model.  We might decide to consider only overlapping generations or new monetarist models.  If we do, then the thinking they do to the effect that money is not redeemable is pointless:  in these models it isn’t, period.    The question is how different monetary policies (eg different amounts of helicopter drops) affect the value of money.  Some preserve it, and some, we know, destroy it.

Alternatively, we might consider models like the one Buiter studies, and doctors, these being models that assume liquidity value of money, and either assume redeemability, or don’t.

But neither does the Simon-Nick thought process make sense for this model.

Which assumption we make, whether you go with Buiter or not,  is a once and for all decision about what the public sector budget constraint looks like out into infinite time, period.  Given this choice about the appropriate way to view the constraint placed on governments, one then figures out optimal monetary and fiscal policy (and what that means for the sequence of money and bonds and taxes that appear in the sequence of budget constraints each period).  Or one says ‘what happens if the government attempted to follow such and such a monetary and fiscal policy, say involving an inflation target of y per cent?’, and then works out the same sequence.  In trying to work this out, one might find that certain combinations of candidate inflation targets and fiscal policies are not feasible.   To repeat, as a mathematical matter, in describing a working artificial economy, we don’t say ‘we can dispense with the redeemability assumption because all money created in pursuit of a given inflation target won’t be redeemed’.   In fact, in the redeemability version of the model, we never get to the end of time, and so money might (depending on choices/outcomes for m) never actually be redeemed!

If Simon and Nick’s remarks are not points of theory, then redeemability is not something to concern ourselves with.  Instead, we would forget about it and turn to empirics to figure out what would happen following a helicopter drop.

If you are still with this post, further points are made in the exchanges around the notion that helicopter drops in pursuit of an inflation target need not generate hyperinflation and the corresponding destruction of money’s value.

Perhaps!  But perhaps not.  For example, the inflation target in the UK is a very fragile thing.  The Treasury can change it whenever it wants by writing a letter.  It did already once, to change definition (or was it to create a bit more inflation through the back door?).  It could do it again.  (After all some, like Krugman, Blanchard, Summers (and me) have been urging that this is a good idea, in case the natural rate will be very low for a while. )  It can even take back control over monetary policy for short periods if it wants to.  Or for longer periods with a vote in Parliament.  The entire BoE act could be repealed by a simple majority.  So I don’t view the inflation target as a cast iron protection against helicopter drops undermining monetary and fiscal policy.  There’s a good reason why monetary financing is outlawed by the Treaty of Rome.  Allowing yourself tightly regulated helicopter drops is not time-consistent.  Once government gets a taste for it, how could it resist not helping itself to more?

Simon, Eric and others might be right.  It could work safely.  But what is the point of taking the risk, when there is ample room for more fiscal stimulus of a conventional sort that leaves our monetary and fiscal affairs intact?   Or for more unconventional operations exchanging reserves or short-dated gilts for private sector assets?  If we were at 150% debt/GDP, or over-extended as far as QE or credit easing was concerned, I might be prepared to  countenance it.  But now, this debate seems frankly, well, academic!

 

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Janet Yellen should keep off the inequality topic

Janet Yellen’s remarks were ill-judged, in my view, and invite attacks on the institution of the Fed and the independence of monetary policy. They also don’t do a great service to the cause of doing something about inequality.

1. She reveals what is in the US lexicon a political position on a politically contentious topic. Those on the right will paint her as looking like an overtly liberal appointee to a job that was supposed to be reserved for technocrats.

2. The effect of 1 is to reduce the credibility of her interventions on topics that are closer to home. If, for example, she chose to make the point that, in the face of the weakening global economy, monetary policy, with unconventional instruments strained to the maximum, could do with a helping hand from fiscal policy, this would look more like partisan harping on the part of the Democrats, and be less likely to have any effect.

3. Revealing her politics makes it more likely that the next appointee will be chosen more for political acceptability than macroeconomic and monetary expertise. If the Republicans were to win some subsequent Presidential election when the post falls free, it raises the chance of a revenge appointment – of an ideologue.  Reading this back, it sounds as though I presume that past appointments were free of politics.  Clearly not, but doing the right thing can help keep the appointment as apolitical as possible.

4. Once the appointment becomes thus more politicised, potential candidates might then seek to compete by offering cooperation, eroding the independence of monetary and financial stability from the electoral cycle.

5. The intervention could reduce the room for manoeuvre of the Fed at a time when the US economy could ill afford this. Unmasked as a liberal, other Fed counter-cyclical policies might come to be viewed as a liberal conspiracy to subvert the joyous workings of capitalism. This view has already taken hold in the extremes of US discourse, but it could gain wider acceptance. Central banks around the world, the Fed included, are already accused of overreach, intervening where they hadn’t previously, much. So this is not the time to try to appropriate the right to comment on matters of redistribution.

6. Inequality is not irrelevant to monetary policy. There are well worked through arguments about how increases in income directed towards the already well off will generate smaller in creases in spending than those directed at the poor.   (The rich already have enough, and will stash more of an increase in income.)  And changes in inequality might, using similar arguments, be thought to change the natural rate of interest, currently presumed to be very low, and restricting the Fed’s freedom of movement. But Ms Yellen’s interventions were not on these terms. And given the heated nature of political fighting in Congress, I would have thought that even broaching this aspect ought to have been done in as technical and neutral way as possible.  Instead, her remarks draw emotional connections with the topic of what constituted the founding mission of the US’s constitutional visionaries.   From the point of view of monetary policy today, it’s pretty irrelevant how much less unequal US society was 30 or 40 years ago.

7. Ms Yellen will be perceived by some to be unqualified to speak on the topic. Her citing inheritance as a force for good on inequality was pretty peculiar.  Inheritance is an opportinuty for the person who gets one, sure.  But, if it were possible to do it, and without hurting incentives, collecting inheritances and handing them out more equally as a subsidy would seem to do a better job!  If fighting inequality is a priority, and you think you have to limit your airtime carefully, and choose your interventions, would you think that a Fed chair speech is a good occasion to fight the battle? Not me.

8. At such a critical time for monetary policy, with continuous scrutiny of every Fed utterance for clues about the exit strategy from loose policy, and how and whether it would be modified to take account of the recent worsening global climate, it seems odd to consume scarce airtime by talking off topic like this. Making the same point that I directed at Andy Haldane’s speech on the economics of volunteering, I’d say it was better to keep to the more mundane task of continually refining and repeating the message about monetary instruments. After all, some will argue that this is what their tax dollars are going to the Fed for.

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The Fed dog is not being wagged by the freshwater or saltwater academic tails

This post replies to a Bloomberg View piece by Noah Smith, which I would caricature as describing the Fed’s economic analysis staff as a dog being wagged alternately by laissez faire freshwater, RBC academics and then activist, sticky-price New Keynesian thinkers.

The picture he paints is worrying, because, if, like me, you are convinced that the Fed should be actively using its instruments to smooth the business and inflation cycle, you might worry from his description of things that soon the freshwater lot will win out and the Fed will, well, give up and go home.

But I don’t see the Fed economics community like that. I’m not and never have been a Fed insider, so this reply comes with that health warning, but…

For starters I see that the activist school of thought holds sway, and has always held sway over the last 30 years, and there’s no danger of the flexible price academics taking over.  I also don’t see the Fed as a passive participant in the battle for ideas, but as an active and, along some dimensions, pioneering and decisive force.

I’d cite several bits of Fed intellectual activism.

a) the embracing of the Cowles Commission program for macro and policy modelling.  In academia, these models died off completely, living on only as fond regrets in the occasional academic blogger. But in central banks, where they were ‘perfected’, they lived on.  Even now the Board of Governors has FRB-US, which is, huge, only partially microfounded, embraces departures from rational expectations, and is used for forecasting.

b) the working out of the early pieces of wisdom about good and bad policy rules, on these pre-NK linear, rational expectations models. Taylor is credited with crystallising the ‘Taylor Rule’ (hence the name). But actually many in central bank circles credit the development of rules like this – both their good performance in models, and their similarity to actual central bank rates – to the published and unpublished work of people like Bryant, Henderson, Mckibben and others, all at the Board of Governors at the time.

c) the embellishment of, and the implications for optimal policy of the new NK models. A line of work through Blanchard-Kiyotaki, then Rotemberg-Woodford and McCallum-Nelson developed the first microfounded NK models for policy analysis. But Fed economists took these on stages further, and the major journals have many papers by Fed economists at the time, like Erceg, Henderson, Levin, Williams, Laubach, Edge, Kiley.    (Actually, on reflection, you could even interpret Woodford’s early papers on inflation stabilisation and welfare as a response to the conviction, then unfounded, that the Fed should be stabilising weighted sums of inflation and output gap deviations.  They were missions to formalise what the Fed already felt instinctively was the right thing to do.)

d) policy analysis with non-rational expectations: this was a literature begun by those outside the Fed – Bray, Sargent, Evans and Honkapohja. But several papers by Orphanides and Williams discussing the implications of non-rational expectations and less than perfect information brought this work to centre stage. Retaining the capacity to simulate the main policy model under alternatives to rational expectations could itself be seen as intellectual activism. Many central banks don’t.

e) Quantitative Easing. This was pursued vigorously, despite most knowing that the prevailing NK wisdom was that it would not work, and only later did evidence accumulate that it might work, in the sense of having material effects on yields. I count this as intellectual activism (leading clearly to policy activism).  As well as doing it, the Fed have naturally been at the frontier of trying to figure out whether it worked or not.  Other central banks have too.  But the Fed, which is distinctive in allowing staff to publish results that might be off-message in policy terms (contrast the UK where research outputs were always actively filtered) has been able to speak with some credibility.  The same intellectual actvism is evidence by the other post-crisis interventions too – like the TARP, TALF schemes, for example.  Or, of course, the decisions to bail out or not.

f) Monetary policy and robustness.  I credit the Fed with decisive contributions here too.  Particularly with work on the ‘fault’ tolerance of Taylor-like rules, (how wrong can you go if you get the model wrong) relative to pursuing what you think might be optimal policy, but might turn out not to be.  This work is surveyed in the Handbook of Monetary Economics chapter by Taylor and Williams [FRBSF President], and features original work by other Fed staff.

Debating Noah on Twitter, he countered by wondering about the vocal RBC-ers in the employ of the Federal Reserve System. If they have no effect, how come they are there? Isn’t their presence evidence of the battle of ideas in the Fed still going on? Possibly. But a few responses.

1)To an outsider at least, it seems to me that the policy debate is shaped more by those in the Board of Governors than the regional Feds. With no systematic evidence whatsoever, I assert that the RBC-ers are disproportionately located in the regions.

2)The business model behind hiring researchers encourages a policy of letting many flowers, including modern RBC, bloom. To get the benefit of the cleverest economists and their insights into policy, you have to give them a certain amount of their time to do what they want.

3)Many sticky price central bank activists have at the core of their preferred model a beating RBC heart. So RBCers have a lot to say to them that’s useful. For example, about real frictions that might exist, and the possibility of real tools used recently by the central bank, and monetary policy, to alleviate them.  Such people often view the job of monetary policy as being to try to make the economy look as much like the RBC one as possible had the frictions not got in the way.  Seen like this, it’s obvious why you need RBC people to tell you how to do monetary policy.  Also, RBCers in the Fed system, many pioneers in modern macro, are often those contributing to the debates about methodology that central banks have to care about: how to build models and solve them, and how to test them.

So, with interest rates pressed against the zero bound, and quantitative easing purchases having swelled the Fed balance sheet, both expressing the prevailing view that the Fed should strain as hard as it can to achieve its dual mandate (the employment goal of which would make little sense to the Freshwater lot), I don’t expect a retreat any time soon.  That is, not until the data warrant it and the activist controllers at the Fed see their job as done.

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Don’t call the helicopters yet!

This prompted by twitter commentary on Buiter’s recent paper explaining why helicopter drops will always work and stimulate the economy;  a formal paper echoing the call for money printing by Mark Blyth and Eric Lonergan in Foreign Affairs.

Buiter’s paper conducts surgery on the modern monetary DSGE model.  The surgery appears to make the model more realistic.  In the original, it’s assumed that somewhere off in the infinite recesses of time, the government will pay back all outstanding bonds it has issued, but will also redeem money it printed for real consumption goods too.  In this way it’s policies are set to satisfy the public sector intertemporal budget constraint.  Buiter says:  no one seriously believes the money is going to be ‘redeemed’.  So let’s remove that assumption.  His model retains the rest of the original machinery, notably, the ASSUMPTION that for some reason unspecified, holders attach a non-pecuniary benefit to holding money.

In the old model, if the helicopters rained down government bonds on the populus, said populus would think:  ‘hang on, these are not net wealth to me [HT Barro], because sooner or later they are going to be paid back out of my taxes.  Similarly, in the old model, if the helicopters rained down money, people would say ‘the government is going to have to pay for this gift when it redeems the money from whoever has it, and I will be taxed for it’.  In the new model, Buiter makes money net wealth in a way that it wasn’t previously.

Actually, that wasn’t the whole story.  In the old model, what people would say when money rained down on them would depend on whether we were at the zero bound or not.  If we were, at that point it would be the case that people already had sufficient money that the non-pecuniary like they had for it would have been exhausted.  This benefit is assumed to capture money’s function as a convenient medium of exchange. And the idea is that beyond some point, it’s useless to keep your wealth in money [perhaps even costly].  Once that benefit disappears, interest rates have to be zero:  this measures the opportunity cost of holding money, which has to be equal to its benefit.  If you are still with me, this means that whether money has any effect or not will hinge on whether at the zero bound people view it as net wealth.  And if they don’t, because it is to be redeemed, they won’t spend as though it were.  This is how Buiter gets his stimulatory effect.

This sounds like a triumph.  A more realistic model, showing how helicopter drops can stimulate?  Not so fast.  Forget the real world for a moment.  In the model world, we have just assumed that people value money for its own sake [to capture a parable about how they would value its convenience].  And as modellers, this seems ok either because we feel, or from other work we can derive, that this convenience value will emerge attached to an asset that is redeemed.  Once we take away the redemption assumption, it begs the question why the convenience value as a medium of exchange is there.  After all, the real story of paper money was that it was once redeemable, and that was why it became an acceptable medium of exchange.  So, as modellers, we ought to feel very uncomfortable about Buiter playing fast and loose with the government’s intertemporal budget constraint.  [Actually, some modellers, the 'new monetarists' like Williamson, Wright, Lagos, Kiyotaki, go ballistic about this mainstream model of money for the simple assumption of convenience value regardless of whether money is in the government budget constraint or not].

You might say:  but what about the real world?  Surely no-one thinks money is going to be redeemed do they?  Surely despite this they will always place a convenience value on holding money?  Well, maybe, or maybe not.  Maybe once helicopters rain down money, people will think that the UK or US governments will get a taste for it, will think that we have become ‘like Zimbabwe’ and run for gold, or other metals, or even, as in revolutionary France as their currency got debased, wine and cheese.  What about the law of legal tender?  Someone once said to me in the Bank of England that the reason why money has value is because of the law of legal tender.  [Which stipulates that a debt is to be considered closed if settled with, legal tender].  This has a grain of truth in it, but a lot of falsehood.  The law of legal tender, and the widespread use and acceptance of pound coins [first draft wrote pound notes, revealing my age] are symbiotic facets of our monetary system, and the former doesn’t solely determine the latter.  I’ve no doubt that if the government started debasing the currency, dollarisation would ensue here as fast as could be, and the law of legal tender would not matter at all.

This leads me to be strongly against helicopter drops of money.  I don’t buy the model-based explanation, because Buiter’s removal of the ‘redeemability’ characteristic of money leaves the model begging too many questions about why money is valued at all.  And I think the doubts we can tell about such a model connect to practical concerns we might have about the real world, that such drops would completely undermine the monetary system, not save it.

This tale has a cross-over with the early part of the story of quantitative easing in the UK, in which I was a junior civil servant writing confusing memos not that dissimilar to this blog post.  It became clear to me and others that most if not all of those who were deciding at that time didn’t know about the redeemability assumption explicit in the models.  (I’d gone a large part of my time at the Bank not grasping it myself, and had to be talked through it by cleverer colleagues).  They scoffed at it when it was spelled out to them.  Their view was:  well, the real world isn’t like that, so pumping all this money out there via QE will work.  This is why the early communication on QE, and even now the educational material the BoE produces on the topic, stressed the monetary ‘injection’, and why there was no sweating about what assets to buy or that the MPC itself should decide this.  If the only point was to get money out there, buying the assets was just a detail that functionaries in the BoE could carry out, not a policy decision.  Only later, as evidence mounted that money expansion was immaterial, and buying duration in gilts was highly material, did the language, and eventually the policy behind QE, change.

Once again you might interject and say:  Tony, they were right, redeemability was false, wasn’t it?  Well, who knows.  But whether they really understood this or not, the BoE ditched redeemability in their hearts, but still kept on working with a model that had it, but yet had to be then doctored with judgement to superimpose a stimulus they thought money would give that wasn’t there in the model itself.  (There was none of the internal consistency, however questionable, of Buiter’s paper).  So their forecasts were based on a  fundamental, technical hotch-potch, assuming as it did that the stimulus would work through just like any other, when interest rates were away from the zero bound.  But actually, in truth, the BoE were flying completely blind, and all the paraphanalia and whizz-banginess of the DSGE based forecast, which might have comforted some, was [actually, still is], on this account, something of a smoke and mirrors show.

 

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The Kingston University Heterodox Economics Business Model

Kingston University Economics Department have been hiring.  And it made me wonder about the business model of their department.  The hiring is prompted by the recruitment of the author of international bestseller ‘Debunking Economics’ by Steve Keen.  The ads made a clear pitch for someone who is doing research in and is inclined towards heterodox economics.

This is a brave move.  Because in the short-term, it is going to mean less funding for research.  For two reasons.  First, if Kingston University gets any ESRC [Economics and Social Research Council] money for this purpose at all, they will get less of it at the next Research Excellence Framework exercise in 2021.  As this is largely determined by the success of academics at publishing.  And recruiting heterodox economists like Steve and others like him will mean fewer publications in top ranked journals.  As Steve accepts, for good or ill, these journals don’t currently publish heterodox papers, as Steve would define them.  Their editors and referees would, I guess, view what he and his peers do as, at best, provocative question-posing, but a waste of time as far as substantive research goes.

Second, I’ll forecast that the tilt towards heterodox staff will mean less money raised through direct research grants (eg through the ESRC ).  This money will follow those who have track-records in delivering what the profession (rightly or wrongly) currently deems to be top ranked journals.  It’s possible that the department’s submission to (Kingston’s submission to) the REF will be looked at differently.  ESRC exercise judgement in ‘marking’ publications of the academic team in an institution.  And it’s possible that there is money out there earmarked for those wishing to take a tilt at the econ mainstream.  But in conversation over Twitter, Steve seemed to accept these forecasts of mine as I put them to him.

So, less money from these sources for research ought to mean less time for research, right?  Wrong, seemingly.  Steve thought there would be ‘more’ time.   This is pretty puzzling.  Less money from these two funding sources for research time means more dependence on money brought in through fee income by student numbers.  Steve described that Kingston’s National Student Survey scores were rising, and that their positioning as a heterodox department would help those rankings rise even more.  But how will this free up more time per academic staff member for research?  If the NSS improvements drive up student numbers and fees stay the same, then unless the academic staff/student-contact-hour ratio falls, there will be no more time for research.  Perhaps they are counting on increasing fees to pay for extra academic staff amongst which to divide their existing teaching load.

Steve Keen also mentioned, plausibly, that they were hoping to pick up students disaffected with the hegemony of (what he calls) ‘mainstream’ economics in the curriculum offered by other departments.  This argument has something going for it, because you can see that Manchester’s ‘Post Crash Economics Society’ has made quite some headway publicising its discontent with Manchester’s offering.

But how many students are there in this category who will go to Kingston?  Somewhat depressingly, I’ve always found most students in my subject that I’ve encountered, pretty much ever since I did my own undergraduate degree back in the late 1980s, as unswervingly focused on their ‘bottom line’.  Economics is studied by most as a route into government, academia, finance, management consulting.  And rightly or wrongly, I forecast that the vast majority will calculate that their prospects of breaking into these fields are much better if they get good degrees at departments that, as Steve would see it, ‘conform to the status quo’.   One response to this was that in fact the finance profession were chomping at the bit for more heterodox economists to hire.  Despite the intervention of a couple of offensive cyberhets [adapting cybernat terminology here], and an interesting survey of attitudes of hirers by the CFA, I personally doubt that there are enough radical hirers out there to offer a home to Kingston’s students.  Although I have to confess it’s based on the entirely unscientific approach of wondering what anyone I have ever met in finance or Government would actually say about this.

Anyway, capturing disaffected students won’t solve the research problem either, unless by giving them something different they can be satisfied with lower staff/student ratios.  And less time for research would presumably mean….   less contact with the frontier of heterodox economics.  [Although you'll guess that I would think this not such a bad thing].

Steve conceded that KU were taking a risk.  But if no-one ever tried to challenge the status-quo, it would never change.  After all, the Cowles-Commission lot once ruled academia as well as policymaking institutions, and the microfoundations and VAR pioneers were once isolated and considered the fruitcakes.

Although I think Steve’s approach to economics is completely misguided, you have to admire the nobility of this gambit by him and his department.  The money foregone by them in the meantime is a considerable externality to the rest of the discipline.  Perhaps even all disciplines.  Subsidised, test challenges like this help ward off capture by vested academic-political interests and keep the playing field leveller, so ideas can fight it out on the right terms.

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Inequality: is it defensible to nurture equality within a nation, ignoring inequality across nations?

John Cochrane’s remarks about greatly falling inequality across nations dwarfing the detail of slight increases in inequality within some Western capitalist economies are a pretty powerful objection Piketty’s call for redistributive taxes to hit the richest percentiles.  Much how cross-nation inequality has fallen, as Cochrane points out, the poor in the US should be paying Piketty taxes to those further down the global distribution of good fortune.

These remarks set me thinking about whether one could justify redistributing within a nation anyway, ignoring global redistributive priorities.  There are some lines of defence, I think, though none of them feel that comfortable.

1.  Tax avoidance might soar if we levied Piketty taxes on our rich tax-base to hand out to the poor, perhaps even unhinging acceptance of the purpose of taxing for providing local public goods.  Example of the reverse:  the experiments in Brazil with localising and hypothecating taxes at the state level, to improve tax collection.

2.  If we thought the money would be wasted abroad, that’s a reason not to tax and hand it over.  Enter the debates between Easterly, Sachs and the mediators, Banerjee and Dufflo, who debate the efficacy of foreign aid.  There are many reasons why it could be wasted.  It might get stolen.  Even if there was no tax avoidance at home it could be costly to extract the money.  Or there might be insufficient capacity to absorb it productively at the receiving end.

3.  Related to 1, and recalling the Rawlesian social contract argument for redistribution to make up for luck at birth, we could perhaps argue that those not born in our society are not signatories to this contract.  I say related, because this is really a proposal for trying to explain and justify why people might refuse to pay Piketty taxes to the global poor.  This isn’t an argument about race or nationhood.  It could be founded on the forecast that the more widely and distantly the boundary gets drawn around possible signatories to the contract, the less sure one can be that people will keep to it, therefore the less to be gained by going along with it.

4.  The arguments I made in my last post about the nature of the cooperative effort involved in producing the super-success of the super-successful might simply not apply:  for example, a country that did not trade freely, or sponsored theft of intellectual property, or waged war of one kind or another, might be said not to have helped the super-succesful, but hindered them, so they had no entitlement to what they had made.

This blog expands on my twitter feed on the topic, and that prompted some interesting tweets in response from Stuart Ingham at Oxford.  [Check the feed scroll to the right of this page, or my feed on twitter, if you're interested.].  Here endeth the amateur political economy for the day.

 

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